According to online reports, Hyperliquid Joint Venture Company X responded to concerns that "the Hyperliquid protocol may suffer significant losses due to market manipulation": Hyperliquid's margin design strictly ensures the platform's solvency through mathematical mechanisms, HLP's losses are always limited to its own treasury, and the protocol's operation never relies on HLP-this feature existed before the JELLYJELLY incident. The new protection mechanism after the incident only optimized the HLP's ability to withstand damage in backup clearing, and the underlying architecture of the protocol has not changed. In the recent JELLYJELLY incident, an attacker tried to manipulate the HLP (Liquidity Provider Pool) by establishing huge long and short positions on himself. Although the open interest limit at the time allowed positions worth USDC 4 million to be created during trading, the logical loophole was that HLP used its entire fund balance to provide collateral for the liquidation. It needs to be clarified that the platform itself does not pose solvency risks, but HLP does face excessive risk exposure due to market manipulation. At present, HLP's clearing component treasury has set a mortgage cap to limit potential losses through a backup clearing mechanism. Hyperliquid still maintains its original operating mechanism and handles under-mortgaged positions in the following order: 1) market clearing 2) backup clearing 3) automatic deleveraging (ADL). At present, HLP's backup clearing has added a new protection mechanism. By setting a loss cap, the attack cost of manipulating the mark price is much higher than the limited benefits it can obtain from HLP.